The dataset for the site-specific safety evaluation included ten operational DDIs in Missouri. Ten 5 additional interchanges were used as control (comparison) sites for the CG method. Table 1 shows the 6 characteristics of the DDIs and comparison sites. The DDI sites required data for before and after 7 implementation. The data ranged from 36 to 51 months for the before period and 12 to 51 months for the 8 after period. Sites with less than 12 months of after period data were not included in the study. Both 9 before and after periods spanned the same months in order to account for seasonality. Additionally, data 10 from the construction period was not included in the analysis. The posted speed limits on the crossroad 11 ranged from 35 to 45 mph. The number of lanes (both directions combined) on the crossroad between the 12 two ramp terminals also varied across DDI sites, ranging from 3 to 6 lanes. Additional information of the 13 configuration type and distances between ramp terminals and adjacent intersections are shown in Table 1 . 14 Aerial images of the ten DDI sites are shown in Figure 1 . Three of the DDIs were underpasses and the 15 remaining seven were overpasses. 16 The characteristics of interchanges used as control sites for the CG analysis had to closely match 17 the facility characteristics of the DDI sites before the DDI conversion. Identifying control sites for 18 interchanges is more challenging than other facilities due to the complexity of their operations and the 19 small number of interchanges. there is also no criterion to assign a crash to a facility based on queue-related conditions. The Missouri 16
DOT practice considers a threshold of 132 feet from the center of an intersection. This is a significant 17 problem for the safety analysis of freeway interchanges because of the importance of locating crashes on 18 the appropriate interchange component, such as ramp terminals. Therefore a crash review methodology 19 was needed, and it was developed for reviewing crash reports and assigning them to the appropriate 20 interchange facilities, including ramp terminal crashes. The main objective of reviewing individual crash 21 reports was to determine and verify if crashes actually occurred due to one of the ramp terminals of an 22
interchange. Therefore, all crashes that were "ramp terminal related" were of interest. Ramp terminal 23 related means that a crash occurred due to the ramp terminal geometric design, operational performance, 24 and the influence of these factors in driver behavior. According to common crash reporting practices at 25 intersections, crashes that are within a specified threshold from the center of the intersection or functional 26 area are considered intersection-related crashes (5-6, 9). However, there are some specific exceptions to 27 this practice. For instance, a crash that occurs beyond the specified threshold on the exit ramp segment or 28 crossroad legs that are caused by queuing from the ramp terminal, is still ramp terminal related. Rear-end 29 and sideswipe crashes due to the queued traffic from the ramp terminal are also considered ramp terminal 30 related crashes (10). Figure 2 shows a diagram of the functional area of ramp terminals and the areas of 31 queue related crashes at a conventional diamond interchange. 32 33 34
35

FIGURE 2 Ramp Terminal Functional and Queue Related Areas 36
Crash Report Information 1 2
Three items of interest were extracted from every crash report. These items were the location of crash, 3 collision diagram, and narrative/statement of the police officer. These items had information overlap and 4 were cross-checked for consistency with each other. When one of the items was incomplete, the other two 5 items were used to fill in the gaps. 6 7 Location This section of the crash report provided a description of the specific location of the crash, i.e. 8 the road in which the crash was assigned, the roadway direction, distance from reference location, and 9 intersecting road. These fields helped to identify the road on which the crash occurred and the distance 10 from the intersecting road. The accuracy of the distances and the reference point varied according to the 11 officer who filled out the report. 12 13
Collision Diagram The collision diagrams on the crash report showed the circumstances and location of 14 the crash. The legend provided crucial information for interpreting the direction of travel of each vehicle 15 involved in the crash. The amount of detail contained in the collision diagrams depended upon the 16 reporting agency and personnel. If the crash was reported afterwards at the police station or through a 17 phone call, the crash report might not even have a collision diagram. 18 19
Narrative/Statements The narrative contained a written description of the crash and statements collected 20 from witnesses and/or people involved in the crash. The details in this section were also subject to the 21 experience and expertise of the reporting personnel. 22 23
Review and Assignment Procedure 24 25 STEP 1: Crash Location Review The first step in reviewing the crash reports was to determine the 26 specific location of the crash. Initially, the travelway name, orientation, and direction of travel of the 27 vehicle or vehicles involved are determined. The three fields of a crash report described earlier were used 28 to find the specific location of the crash with respect to the interchange orientation. Additionally, an aerial 29 photograph was used to locate and visualize the facilities of the interchange. The information provided in 30 the location, collision diagram, and statement/narratives was sometimes inconsistent within the same 31 report. Therefore, as a general rule, consistency in at least 2 out of the 3 sections was needed. 32 33 STEP 2: Crash Circumstances Review The second step of the review consisted of the examination of 34 the crash events and related circumstances. The statements provided by the witnesses and people involved 35 in the crash had to be carefully interpreted, because those were personal opinions, interpretations, and 36
claims. Such statements might have been made to protect their own interests and to prevent negative 37 consequences. A driver-made claim had to be confirmed by the officer's narrative. The narrative of the 38 officer not only described the crash events but also stated the results of the investigation. 39 40 STEP 3: Assignment of Crashes to Ramp Terminals The assignment of crashes to the correct ramp 41
terminal was the critical step of the entire review process. Crashes that were ramp terminal related were 42 assigned to one of the two ramp terminals of the interchange. Some crashes were further eliminated, 43 because they were rare events not related to the geometric design or operation of the interchange. The 44 following list provides examples of such rare events encountered while reviewing the crash reports: 45  Vehicle avoiding or hitting a wild animal in the functional area of the ramp terminal 46  A crash generated by vehicles pulling over because of an emergency vehicle 47  A crash generated due to police pursuit 48  Vehicle malfunctioning or tire exploding 49  Property damage by object flying out of a vehicle (e.g. windshield breakage or paint damage) 50  Fatal or injured driver due to a drive-by shooting 1  Crashes due to the presence of a work zone at the ramp terminal 2 3
Crashes in which a driver was distracted by a secondary task were not considered rare events. For 4 instance, crashes involving cell phone use, lighting up a cigarette, drinking water, putting on sunglasses, 5 or picking up an item from the passenger seat were not excluded, since other interchange-related factors 6 also contributed to the crash. 7 8
Calibration of Ramp Terminal SPFs 9 10
The calibration of SPFs is the process of adjusting predicted crash frequency to reflect local conditions. 11
The calibration accounts for factors such as driver behavior, crash reporting practices, and climate 12 conditions (6). For collecting calibration data, a master list of sites was generated for signalized and stop 13 controlled conventional diamond interchanges in Missouri. Sites were randomly selected from the master 14 list to generate the sample set for calibration. Only sites whose geometric and operational conditions 15 remained unchanged during the years used for calibration were included. If a site did not meet this 16 criterion, another site was randomly sampled from the master list to replace it. The HSM recommends a 17 dataset of 30 to 50 sites and at least 100 crashes per year for calibration (6). While signalized facilities 18 satisfied these two HSM requirements, stop control facilities did not meet the '100 crashes per year ' 19 requirement due to the low demand on these facilities. After the calibration sample set was established, 20 data was collected to obtain the predicted crashes using the corresponding SPFs and CMFs presented in 21 the supplemental chapters of freeway facilities in the HSM (5). Additionally, the observed crashes were 22 collected for the period of three years between 2010 and 2012. The calibration factor is the ratio between 23 the sum of observed and predicted crashes across all sites. Equation 1 shows the calibration factor 24 calculation recommended by HSM (6). 25 26
27
Safety Effectiveness Evaluation 28 29
The HSM defines safety effectiveness evaluation as the process of estimating change in safety due to a 30 treatment, project, or group of projects. The evaluation of treatment safety effectiveness is critical to 31 providing statistically rigorous estimates for decision-making and policy development (6). The design of 32 before and after observational methods consists of using the before period to estimate what would have 33 been the expected crashes in the after period had the treatment not been implemented and comparing that 34 estimate with the actual observed crashes in the after period (11). In this study, the safety evaluation of 35 DDI ramp terminals was examined using two before and after observational methods-Comparison 36 Group (CG) and Empirical Bayes (EB). The HSM recommends at least 10 to 20 sites for a safety 37 evaluation, and for the CG method, a minimum of 650 aggregated crashes at comparable sites (6). 38 39
Comparison Group Method 40 41
The concept of the Comparison Group (CG) is to identify a group of untreated facilities, similar to the 42 treated facilities before the DDI, to estimate the measure of how safety would have changed for the 43 treatment group. The assumption is that different factors influence safety in the same manner for 44 treatment and comparison groups during before and after periods (11). Each comparison site was 45 carefully selected to resemble traffic, geometry, and crash frequency of the treatment site before the DDI 46 implementation. Also, a comparison site was selected from the same jurisdiction as the DDI site to ensure 47 similar driving population. The suitability of the comparison group was verified using the sample odds 1 ratio test (6, 11). 2
The CG method also uses the HSM crash prediction methodology. It uses SPFs along with the 3 corresponding CMFs and calibration factor ( ) to predict crashes for each treated and comparison group 4 facility with the before period characteristics:
= predicted crash frequency (crashes/year); 8 = predicted crash frequency for ramp terminal SPF (crashes/year) 9 = calibration factor for ramp terminal SPF; 10 = crash modification factor specific to a site type characteristic j. 11 12
The CG method is a significant improvement from other statistical methods such as the Naïve 13 method (which considers only observed crash data) because it accounts for unrecognized or unmeasured 14 causal factors. However, it does not account for regression to the mean bias. The reliability of CG results 15 is anchored upon the assumption of similarity between comparison and treatment sites. Also, the CG 16 method cannot consider treatment sites in which the observed crash frequency in the after period is equal 17 to zero. Thus, it may underestimate the effectiveness of a treatment. In fact, a treatment may have been 18
the most effective at locations where the observed crash frequency during after period was zero (6).
20
Empirical Bayes Method 21 22
For observational before-and-after studies, it is important to understand the underlying reasons for 23 implementing a treatment. Sites chosen for implementing a treatment typically have either operational or 24 safety problems. Thus, a selection bias is introduced into the sample. The Empirical Bayes (EB) method 25 accounts for these sample selection issues and the resulting regression to the mean bias. The EB method 26 also introduces the geometric, operational, surrounding area, and local condition characteristics into the 27 prediction of crashes. The local conditions were included via the calibration factor ( ). 28
SPFs have an additional parameter called the overdispersion parameter (k), which is calculated as 29 part of the estimation process. As its name implies, it provides a measure of the overdispersion of the 30 prediction from the SPF, which is a measure of the quality of the prediction. A larger overdispersion 31 parameter leads to a greater variability in the prediction. The expected crash frequency in Equation 3 is 32 calculated as the weighted average (w) of the observed crashes and the SPF predicted crash frequency. 33 34
Where the weight is determined using the overdispersion parameter of the SPF: 36 37 The comparison of expected and observed crash frequency for the after period forms the basis for 6 deriving the safety effectiveness as shown in Equation 6. In equation 6, ′ is the adjusted odds ratio that 7 accounts for regression to the mean. For more details on computing the adjusted odds ratio, the reader is 8 referred to the HSM (6) or Hauer (11). 9 10 (%) = 100 × (1 − ′) (6) 11 RESULTS 12 13
Calibration of Ramp Terminal SPFs 14 15
After reviewing the crash reports for all facilities and correcting the crash locations, the calibration of D4 16 ramp terminal SPFs was performed. The calibration factors were developed for two severity levels: fatal 17 and injury (FI) and property damage only (PDO). The calibration factors for signalized with two lanes 18 were 1.087 for FI and 2.360 for PDO crashes; for signalized with four lanes were 0.853 for FI and 1.830 19 for PDO crashes; and for stop controlled were 1.290 for FI and 2.298 for PDO crashes. 20
The results of the calibration showed that the crash frequency at ramp terminals of a diamond 21 interchange are generally higher in Missouri in comparison to the data used to develop the SPFs (i.e., 22 Washington, Maine, and California) (5).
24
Safety Effectiveness Evaluation 25 26
The observed and the expected crashes obtained from the two safety evaluation methods are presented in 27 Table 2 . Results in the table are shown by crash severity for each DDI site, two rows for the two ramp 28 terminals at each site. The sum totals of crashes occurring at 'all facilities' combined are shown in the last 29 row. Thus, a total of 414 crashes consisting of 76 fatal and injury and 338 PDO crashes occurred at 30 twenty DDI ramp terminals (i.e., 10 DDI sites) included in this study. Some DDI sites had significantly 31 higher number of crashes than others (e.g., ramp terminals 1 to 6). This was partly because they were in 32 operation for a longer time period. 33
If the observed crashes in the after period are less than the expected crashes, it means that the 34 DDI had a positive safety benefit and helped to reduce the number of crashes. While the observed crashes 35 were lower than the expected crashes for several DDI sites for the two methods, a few sites or methods 36 indicated an opposite trend. The expected crashes for 'all facilities' combined were higher than the 37 observed crashes for FI, PDO, and total (TOT) crashes, for both methods. 38 39 
5
The safety effectiveness values computed using the two methods are presented in Table 3 . The 6 values in each cell indicate percentage change (+ indicating a reduction after DDI) and its standard error 7 expressed in parenthesis. The combined safety effectiveness across 'all facilities' are shown in the last 8 row of Table 3 . The safety effectiveness values for individual DDI sites were predominantly positive 9 indicating a reduction in crashes after DDI. However, as noted earlier, a few sites had a negative safety 10 effectiveness value indicating an increase in total crashes after DDI ('TOT' column in Table 3 ). Two 11 ramp terminals witnessed a statistically significant increase in total crashes at the 95% confidence level 12 with the CG method. These terminals were the ramp terminal on N.13 (i.e., US-60/Kansas Expy. 13 interchange) and ramp terminal N.17 (i.e., I-70/Woods Chapel Rd.). Only one year of after DDI period 14 data was available for these two sites. It is possible that the short duration of after period data may have 15 contributed to the negative safety effectiveness values witnessed at these sites. For PDO and TOT 16 crashes, negative safety effectiveness values were not statistically significant with the EB method. For FI 17 crashes, all negative safety effectiveness value reported in Table 3 were not statistically significant for 18 both methods. 19 In computing the combined 'all facilities' safety effectiveness values, the EB and CG methods 20 considered both the crash trends and their variability at individual DDI sites. Therefore, extreme, albeit 21 not-significant, trends witnessed at a few sites do not bias the aggregated estimate. The safety 22 effectiveness values can be converted to crash modification factors. Although the combined safety 23 effectiveness values are reported for the CG and EB methods in Table 3 , this study recommends using the 24 statistically rigorous EB method to generate CMFs for the ramp terminals of a DDI. The advantages of 25 EB over CG method were discussed earlier in the methodology section. The EB results showed a 26 reduction of 63.4% (4.7%) in FI crashes, 51.2% (3.3%) in PDO crashes, and 54.0% (2.7%) in TOT 27 crashes (see Table 3 ), all estimates being significant at the 95% confidence level. The safety performance of novel alternative designs can be a motivating factor for their selection by 9 transportation agencies facing the challenge of identifying creative solutions to address congestion and 10 safety concerns at interchanges and intersections. Although the DDI design has been increasingly adopted 11 by several states within the last five years, safety performance of the design is still not well documented. 12 This paper takes a step forward in this direction and quantifies the safety of a ramp terminal of a DDI as 13 compared to a conventional diamond interchange. Using data from twenty DDI ramp terminals in 14 Missouri, this study was the first attempt at developing a crash modification factor for DDI ramp terminal 15
facilities. This site-specific safety analysis of ramp terminals complements the project-level safety 16 analysis and interchange-level CMFs developed in Claros et al. (2). 17
Conducting a site-specific safety evaluation can be challenging. The primary challenge faced in 18 this research was the proper identification of crashes that can be attributed to the ramp terminal. A 19 methodology was developed to review crash reports and generate consistent crash assignment to the ramp 20 terminal facilities. The methodology involved an extensive review of crash reports including police 21 officer narratives and collision diagrams. A total of 8,400 crash reports were reviewed. 22
The safety evaluation consisted of two types of observational before-after evaluation methods: 23
Comparison Group (CG) and Empirical Bayes (EB 
